In December, the Pentagon promised Kyiv a new military aid package worth $988 million. The funds will cover ammunition shipments, as well as equipment and vehicle maintenance and repairs. However, the administration of President Joe Biden has barely spent the $6 billion allocated in fiscal year 2024, limiting itself to packages of about $400 million every two weeks. The White House has faced regular backlash for mistakes made in the Russian-Ukrainian war, in particular, for excessive caution in relations with Russia. Nevertheless, the recent authorization for Kyiv to attack targets in Russia with long-range U.S. missiles demonstrates Biden's willingness to take more decisive action. The current U.S. president still has opportunities to strengthen Ukraine's positions in the war with Russia even in the final weeks of his term in office, The Insider's security and defense columnist Colby Badhwar argues. The available options include the delivery of JASSM and SLAM-ER cruise missiles, revising and lowering the oil price cap, tightening control over the enforcement of sanctions, and supplying Ukraine with weapons from South Korea and Israel.
Legacy is a question that weighs heavily on every President of the United States. As Joe Biden serves out his final weeks in office, it is surely on his mind. While the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan turned out to be the turning point in President Biden’s political fortunes, the war in Ukraine will ultimately be the more geopolitically consequential foreign policy event of his single term in office. Fast approaching the start of its fourth year, the war has had truly global implications, impacting food and energy markets worldwide in addition to the devastation wrought on the ground in the warzone.
Yet with just over a month left until Donald Trump reassumes America’s highest office, there is still time for President Biden to correct past mistakes. The last three years has seen his administration repeatedly say no to Ukrainian requests for more military aid, only to finally relent after months or even years of pressure. His decision to authorize Ukrainian use of U.S.-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) for strikes on Russian territory has been the latest development in this series.
The launch of an ATACMS missile
Despite fears within his administration that this decision could provoke significant escalation from Russia, the opposite has happened. In retaliation Moscow struck Ukraine with “Oreshnik,” a new experimental Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile — even if General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff, told his American counterpart General Brown that the launch had actually been planned long in advance. Though that may not be true, the fact Gerasimov said it indicates that Russia sought to prevent further escalation. This should be the nail in the coffin for the Biden Administration’s escalation concerns.
Despite fears within Biden's administration that the authorization to use ATACMS missiles for strikes on Russian territory could provoke significant escalation from Russia, the opposite has happened
The Russians have always understood that the United States maintains escalation dominance, and they have overcome this constraint by exploiting President Biden’s unwillingness to wield it. Decisions on ATACMS, F-16s, cluster munitions, armored vehicles, and everything else could have been made at the outset of the war, and Russia’s response would have been just as muted as it was when the Western systems finally arrived on the battlefield months or years too late. The past obviously cannot be undone, but what happens in the future is determined by the actions taken today. President Biden still has the opportunity to put Ukraine on much stronger footing for the year ahead.
More weapons
Ukraine’s need for armaments does not end with ATACMS. Aside from delivering the missiles in much larger numbers — and giving the Ukrainian command full control over where, when, and how they are used against Russia — the U.S. has other missiles in its arsenal that could be of use to Ukraine. Air-launched cruise missiles like the AGM-158A Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM) and AGM-84H/K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) would provide an essential complement to ATACMS, making strikes on Russian territory much more effective. ATACMS alone, and especially if only used in small quantities, is not going to have any significant impact on the war. However, pairing them with cruise missiles in complex raids on Russian targets would greatly increase the probability that the missiles penetrate enemy air defenses and destroy their intended targets. Both JASSM and SLAM-ER can be provided to Ukraine in meaningful quantities without impacting the readiness of the U.S. Air Force or Navy.
The U.S. Army, on the other hand, will need to accept some trade-offs in order to further America’s immediate national security interest in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian aggression. While Ukraine has received some equipment from Army Prepositioned Stock-2 [APS-2] (Europe), much of it remains untouched, waiting in warehouses just in case U.S. forces end up needing it. The main reason those stockpiles exist is to equip U.S. units that would need to go up against Russia in the event of a head-to-head fight. But so long as the Russian Army is bogged down in Ukraine, the U.S. and the rest of the NATO alliance simply do not need to worry about that contingency plan. It would therefore be appropriate for President Biden to immediately draw down additional vehicles, weapons, and ammunition from APS-2 in support of Ukraine — and then order replacement equipment to replenish those stocks. Such a step will help ensure that Ukraine can adequately resource its units actively on the frontline while also working to establish new brigades.
The U.S. Army will need to accept some trade-offs in order to further America’s immediate national security interest in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian aggression
The Biden Administration has already promised Ukraine a surge in military assistance, but this has yet to materialize. There is over $6 billion in Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) remaining, and the Department of Defense has continued to announce PDA packages at a rate of around just $400 million every two weeks, meaning that the math does not add up to all of the authority being used by Inauguration Day. If the administration taps APS-2 and provides cruise missiles though, then they can execute a real surge in deliveries over the final weeks. They will not be able to get all $6 billion worth of equipment out the door, but they can manage much more than three additional $400 million packages between now and January 20. There is also over $1 billion in Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative funding left to commit, and likely much more than that which still needs to be obligated via contracts. Biden also approved in-country maintenance support — also belatedly — and the Pentagon stated that they were soliciting bids, even if there has been no update on when contract awards will be made. This needs to be a high priority for the next month.
Engaging the indifferent
President Biden has consistently touted his success in assembling an international coalition to support Ukraine — which is undoubtedly true — but not all U.S. allies are being as supportive as they should be. Chief among them is South Korea, which continues to refuse to directly transfer arms to Ukraine even on a commercial basis. This reluctance could be forgiven early in the war, but now, with cooperation between North Korea and Russia growing closer, Seoul’s intransigence cannot be tolerated. North Korea’s partnership with Russia is a direct threat to South Korea. This was readily apparent when the first reports emerged of Russian technology transfers to Pyongyang in exchange for munitions. Now it has escalated to the point that Russia is agreeing to provide them with fighter jets.
It is not tenable for the South Korean government to watch this unfold from the sidelines. I wrote one year ago that a failure to impose costs on Russia for its illicit relationship with North Korea would only encourage further cooperation. Ukraine, the United States, and South Korea cannot afford to waste yet another year. President Biden needs to deliver the message to Seoul that the United States, which still maintains considerable forces permanently stationed in South Korea, cannot care more about South Korean security than South Koreans do. If they are unwilling to provide support to Ukraine on a comparable scale to what Kim Jong Un provides to Putin, then the United States should not maintain such a robust military presence in South Korea. President Trump has already stated that South Korea should be paying significantly more into the Special Measures Agreement, which helps finance the mission of United States Forces Korea. If President Biden wants trilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea — a legacy accomplishment — to survive, he needs to get Seoul better aligned with U.S. interests.
The United States cannot care more about South Korean security than South Koreans do
The same can also be said of Israel, which has been unduly deferential to Russia for years. This had been justified by the need to deconflict with Russian forces in Syria, but that dubious excuse has now evaporated. Bashar al-Assad has fled to Moscow, and the Russian forces left behind are in disarray. Israel does not need Russia’s cooperation or permission to pursue its own interests in Syria, and in any case, Russia never exercised any deference to Israeli interests. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s relationship with Putin is a one-way street. His response to Israeli deference was an increase in military cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran. It is long past due for the Israeli government to recognize that weakening Russia is also in their national security interests — and for Jerusalem to act accordingly. President Biden can hasten this development by re-engaging Israel on the issue of third-party transfers of defense articles to Ukraine. Germany has been seeking to provide Israeli-designed Spike anti-tank missiles to Ukraine since 2022. Spike is in service with most of Europe, so this move could unlock a considerable number of them. Israel should not require any encouragement to take these steps, but the Biden administration can offer carrots, such as signing off on paused and slow-walked pending arms sales, and offering expedited delivery of other equipment on order.
It is also never too late to step up enforcement of sanctions against Russia. The Insider’s investigations have continued to find that Russia is circumventing U.S. and EU restrictions by importing controlled goods via third countries. The price cap on Russian oil exports also needs to be re-examined. At $60 per barrel, Russia is still able to generate more than enough profit to finance its war machine. Replacing Russian energy on the global market with American energy should be a point of bipartisan agreement in the United States. Getting the ball rolling on a lower price cap now synergizes well with the incoming Trump Administration’s goal of increasing U.S. oil and gas production.
Getting the ball rolling on a lower price cap synergizes well with the incoming Trump Administration’s goal of increasing U.S. oil and gas production
Something that is likely off the table though, regardless of who is in the White House, is an immediate NATO invitation for Ukraine. This has been a pointless distraction since the beginning of the war, as Hungary would undoubtedly veto Ukraine’s accession even if every other member was in favor of it. Any security guarantees Ukraine receives in the short term will likely need to be bilateral. NATO accession is unlikely to move forward until after the war formally ends.
Careful optimism
There have been endless suggestions that anything President Biden does will be swiftly undone by President Trump, but so far there are indications that there may be more continuity than many are expecting. General Keith Kellogg (Ret.), Trump’s designee for Special Envoy for Ukraine and Russia, said that President Biden’s decision to finally authorize ATACMS strikes has “actually given President Trump more leverage.” All of the other aforementioned steps would do the same. Empowering Ukraine now both helps Kyiv on the battlefield and puts Moscow in a worse negotiating position. While the ultimate outcome of the war will depend on the future decisions of Presidents Trump, Zelensky, and Putin, this is Biden’s last chance to improve the legacy he leaves behind.
Retired Gen. Keith Kellogg, Trump's Ukraine-Russia envoy
Those future decisions are of course difficult to predict, but the limited indications available from the transition process are far from the worst-case scenarios that had been imagined. The selections of Kellogg as Special Envoy, Senator Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, and Representative Mike Waltz as National Security Advisor are encouraging signs. In Congress, Republicans assuming control of the Senate is a positive development, with staunch supporters of Ukraine set to take all the key positions. Senator John Thune, the incoming Majority Leader, will continue to advocate for additional support for Ukraine, just as his predecessor Senator McConnell has. McConnell, despite giving up the top job, is assuming the Chairmanship of the powerful Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, which controls the overwhelming majority of U.S. defense spending. The Chair of the full Appropriations Committee passes to Senator Susan Collins, another strong Ukraine ally. The other three key national security Committees — Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Intelligence — will also be headed by staunch advocates of increased military aid for Ukraine in Senators Roger Wicker, Jim Risch, and Tom Cotton, respectively.
Republicans assuming control of the Senate is a positive development, with staunch supporters of Ukraine set to take all the key positions
In the House of Representatives, Speaker Mike Johnson’s razor thin majority will certainly complicate his ability to bring any legislation to the floor, Ukraine-related or not. Around a quarter of his conference is certain to vote against any support for Ukraine, but since the start of the war the remaining Congressional Republicans have shown themselves to be either reliable “yes” votes, or at least persuadable. Ultimately, most Republicans will likely fall into line behind whatever strategy President Trump outlines. While the ultimate shape of Ukraine policy under Trump 2.0 remains a mystery, it is possible that an additional Supplemental Appropriation to support Ukraine may be passed as a compromise between Democrats and Republicans in order to get around the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) caps on discretionary defense spending. Under such a deal, the Fiscal 2025 Presidential Drawdown Authority cap would be raised so that deliveries of equipment and ammunition to Ukraine could continue until next October, and a substantial amount of money would be appropriated to purchase replacements. This would boost the Pentagon’s procurement budget without actually increasing its annual appropriation of funds beyond what the FRA allows for.
Ukrainians will of course continue to resist Russia’s illegal invasion regardless of whether anyone helps them or not. Their determination to fight will complicate any effort to force a premature peace upon them. A just end to the war can only happen upon terms which are acceptable to the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian citizens.
A just end to the war can only happen upon terms which are acceptable to the Ukrainian government and Ukrainian citizens
After three years, those terms may now differ from what would have been acceptable back in 2022 or 2023, but it remains Kyiv’s right to choose which potential concessions are acceptable. It is not an ideal position to be in, but nothing in this war has been ideal. President Biden still has cards left to play though, and it is in the interest of both Ukraine and the United States that he plays them well in order to pass the strongest hand possible off to President Trump next month. He and President Zelensky have not seen eye to eye on everything, but one thing that they do agree on is that the war has gone on for far too long.