Climate control: How Russia turned environmentalism into a tool of political influence

RU

From skepticism to activism

Members of the current Russian leadership have historically been climate skeptics, viewing the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as a threat to economic growth — particularly to that of Russia. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly expressed doubt that the cause of climate change is anthropogenic, reserving particular public skepticism for the idea that the burning of fossil fuels is responsible for rising temperatures. He has also often claimed that climate change will benefit Russia due to the improved transportation capabilities of the Northern Sea Route. Polls show that many Russians do not believe in climate change and do not see global warming as a major problem.

Just before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there was hope that Russia, while pursuing its economic interests, would actually begin to participate as much as possible in the global fight against climate change. Russia could have become the largest contributor to the CBAM, a cross-border carbon tax that the EU began implementing in October 2023 to reduce emissions in countries with lower environmental standards.

In addition, Western investors were also showing increased interest in promoting Russian companies’ use of green raw materials and green electricity. Thus, the decarbonization of the economy, or at least the appearance of it, temporarily gained popularity in Russia simply as a way to attract more foreign investment.

However, after the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, CBAM lost its relevance for exporters. Western sanctions changed the geography of Russian trade, and attracting Western investment became unpromising. The Russian authorities focused on confrontation with the West and on deepening partnerships with developing countries that are not interested in decarbonization. This policy is based on the thinking of Putin and the wider Russian elite — about climate change, energy economics, and the development of modern technology. At the same time, the Kremlin is using its own platforms – environmental forums and organizations – to fight the enemy. Only now, they are promoting their own agenda.

Myths about the “cleanliness” of Russia's energy sector

The main cause of global climate change is the extraction and combustion of fossil fuels, which account for 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions and 90% of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. 90% of the energy consumed in Russia is produced using these types of fuels. However, this does not prevent the Russian leadership from trying to convince the world that Russian energy is somehow cleaner than that of its competitors.

“In Russia, 85% of our energy balance comes from clean, low-emission generation,” Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin claimed at COP29. “This is primarily gas and nuclear energy, along with renewable sources.”

According to Russia’s official position, this means the country’s electricity generation is 85% “clean.” The “dirty” portion supposedly comes only from coal, which indeed accounts for a relatively small share in Russia — just 17.9%, compared to the global average of 35.5%. Therefore, the argument goes, Russia does not need to reduce its emissions any further.

While nuclear power plants (NPPs) and hydropower plants (HPPs) do not emit CO2 into the atmosphere, the same cannot be said for natural gas. In Russia, nearly 45% of electricity generation relies on natural gas. As for the remainder, over 35% comes from hydropower and nuclear plants. Gas is also widely used domestically for heating and cooking.

If we assess the “cleanliness” of Russian energy using global criteria (which categorize large hydropower plants and nuclear power plants as “clean”), the share of “clean” electricity in Russia comes in at 37.2%. This is below the global average of 42%. And that’s without considering the transport sector in Russia, which relies entirely on fossil fuels, or the heating sector, where an energy transition has barely even been discussed.

CO2 emissions from burning natural gas are less than half those from burning coal, but the extraction and transportation of gas is accompanied by significant methane leaks into the atmosphere. Over a 20-year period, methane’s greenhouse effect is 86 times stronger than that of CO2 per unit of mass. Thus, reducing methane emissions is the fastest way to slow global warming. Recently, methane emissions have been reassessed globally, as previous estimates were significantly understated. Available data indicates that methane emissions have already contributed to around 30% of the observed rise in global air temperatures.

The Global Methane Pledge, announced at the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow in November 2021, aims to cut methane emissions by at least 30% by 2030 compared to 2020 levels. The initiative has been endorsed by the European Union and 158 other countries. Russia, however, has notably abstained, unsurprising given its status as a global leader in methane emissions from oil and gas production.

The Kremlin's version of environmental advocacy

Russian climate policy has historically shown strong opposition to solar and wind energy, which are key components of the Western clean energy transition. In the West, solar and wind power are considered the primary solutions to the climate crisis: they produce the cheapest electricity, are available in almost all regions, are easily scalable, and can often be brought online in under a year.

But in Russia, due to the prejudices of the elite, solar and wind energy are not taken seriously. For instance, Vladimir Putin has stated that wind turbines kill birds, drive worms out of the soil, and that generating sufficient electricity from wind and solar would require covering the planet with a forest of turbines and multiple layers of solar panels.

Presumably out of concern for the worms, Russia has developed its own methods of combating climate change. These include maintaining the “cleanest” energy generation structures established during Soviet times, promoting Russian gas and nuclear reactors globally, advancing discussions about “clean coal,” and proposing plans to absorb greenhouse gas emissions through forests and other ecosystems, including prehistoric ones.

At the 2023 COP28 Climate Summit in Dubai, Russia presented the “Pleistocene Park” experiment, which aims to recreate a mammoth-era ecosystem in the Arctic to absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. The project is funded by the foundation of coal oligarch Andrey Melnichenko.

In October 2021, just weeks before the COP26 Climate Summit in Glasgow, Putin announced that Russia intended to become carbon-neutral by 2060. This goal was indeed declared at the Glasgow summit and was included in Russia’s “Strategy for Socio-Economic Development with Low Greenhouse Gas Emissions Until 2050” (the “low-carbon development strategy”) adopted on Nov. 1, 2021. However, Russia has demonstrated no real intention of reducing emissions, as evident from its official plans and strategies.

Under Russia’s plan, the “inertial” scenario outlined in the strategy predicts a 19% increase in greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 compared to 2019, along with a 25% rise in net emissions (emissions minus absorption). Greenhouse gas absorption levels would remain unchanged from 2019. The “intensive” target scenario envisions a 14% reduction in emissions by 2050 compared to 2019, coupled with a more than twofold increase in absorption. Net emissions would drop by 60%, primarily due to absorption.

Sections of the document on greenhouse gas absorption focus mainly on forests, with brief mentions of carbon storage in soils and absorption by bodies of water. However, scientific research suggests that the carbon absorption capacity of Russian forests is expected to decline.

In 2023, there were discussions about revising the low-carbon development strategy due to Russia’s restricted access to Western technologies. This means that Russia’s emission reduction goals will likely become even less ambitious in the near future, with planned reduction targets adjusted downward accordingly.

Russia's first nationally determined contribution (NDC) to the Paris Agreement on climate change actually allows the country to increase emissions until 2030. In 2020, when Russia announced its NDC, its emissions were slightly above 50% of levels observed in 1990. The Russian NDC envisions a “reduction” to 70% of the 1990 levels by 2030 — effectively permitting an increase in emissions.

This means that while Russia’s rhetoric is that of a country with an independent climate policy, its actions in this area are largely performative. In reality, Russia's climate action is aimed at weakening global carbon reduction policies, as they could jeopardize the value of Moscow’s fossil fuel rents. Moreover, Russia is actively seeking allies to fight the global decarbonization effort.

Political influence disguised as environmental policy

Russia is actively promoting its climate policy internationally, especially to developing countries — influencing the member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the BRICS countries is one of its goals. Russia is also working to stop the implementation of the European CBAM mechanism by turning to international platforms such as the WTO and the UN Climate Change Conferences. Finally, Russia sees its mimicry of climate policy as a tool to make its case for the lifting of sanctions imposed after it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to Russian officials, at least low-carbon technologies should be exempted from sanctions.

In October 2024, the BRICS Summit took place in Kazan, where Vladimir Putin aimed to form an anti-Western coalition and demonstrate that Russia is not isolated. The summit’s final declaration mentioned climate over 20 times, echoing Russia’s usual rhetoric. The document emphasized the need to consider the “structure of national economies and energy consumption, as well as the specific circumstances of countries whose economies depend on the sale or consumption of fossil fuels and related energy-intensive products” in achieving a “just energy transition.” It also supported the “principle of technological neutrality,” advocating for the use of all available energy sources — including fossil fuels, as well as natural and liquefied petroleum gas — with technologies for reducing and capturing emissions.

Russia is particularly eager to promote its approach to climate policy in developing countries, especially in the post-Soviet space, as evidenced by its efforts to export Russian nuclear reactors. During Putin’s 2024 visits to Uzbekistan and Mongolia (not a post-Soviet state), discussions included plans for Russia’s state atomic energy corporation, Rosatom, to build small nuclear reactors.

Russia also plans to construct nuclear power plants in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. If realized, these projects would all but ensure these countries’ dependence on Russia for decades to come — particularly in the areas of energy technologies, fuel, and possibly even financing. Meanwhile, wind and solar energy have been developing rapidly in these nations, often outpacing Russia’s progress in renewable energy. Many experts believe that introducing nuclear power plants would slow the growth of renewables by diverting massive financial resources and maintaining high centralization in energy systems — meaning one Russian nuclear power plant would supply large areas, reducing the need for other energy sources. (The Insider has previously reported on how Rosatom is used by Moscow as a tool for political influence.)

Outside the post-Soviet space, however, Russia’s influence on environmental policy remains limited. Given Donald Trump’s looming return to the White House, any rise in global climate skepticism in the near future is more likely to be linked to the American president than to Vladimir Putin.